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Wake-up call for the Lowlands: Dutch counterterrorism
from a comparative perspective
Monica den Boer1
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Abstract The Netherlands is one of the few countries in Western Europe that did not
experience massive terrorist attacks and where counterterrorism actions did not feature
prominently on the political agenda. Until quite recently, the Netherlands had neither
emergency legislation for terrorist incidents nor a specific Act that criminalized terrorist
offences. In response to the European Union framework legislation, a bill was produced
that penalizes participation in a terrorist organization, flanked by a vast array of other
measures. This article analyses the policy, institutional and legislative responses to
terrorism in the Netherlands and compares these with responses from other European
states. The events of 9/11, as well as the political and public anxiety over the murders of
Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, acted as a firm wake-up call for the Netherlands insofar
as the threat of terrorism is concerned. Whilst most countries adopted an incremental
approach to countering terrorism, the Netherlands witnessed a radical shift in criminal
justice and law enforcement policy following these events.
Introduction
The events of 9/11 were a firm wake-up call for the Netherlands. It was rapidly
succeeded by an announcement by the then Minister of Justice that a new anti-
terrorist law would be enacted. The new law, which flows from the European
Union Framework decision on combating terrorism,2 entered into force on 10 August
2004, effectively criminalizing terrorism (including its preparation and conspiracy
to carry out terrorist acts) as a separate criminal offence. Moreover, to enhance
counterterrorism efforts, numerous proposals were submitted to facilitate the
demand for data from the financial sector, to introduce compulsory identification,
and to facilitate proactive investigation methods.
The leading assumption in this article is that the attacks of September 11, 2001
provided Dutch authorities with a policy opportunity to introduce a series of
measures against terrorism and crime in general. Against the background of a
rapidly changing political climate, in which Pim Fortuyn hailed victory with his
anti-immigration programme, and in which the centre-right government sought
1 I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers, as well as the editors, for their
helpful and constructive comments on earlier versions of this article. The responsibility for
this article rests, however, solely with the author.
2 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 164/3, 22 June 2002, 3–7.
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to reassert authority in a society that seemed to have lost its compass, a sense of
insecurity dominated popular and political discourse alike. The government’s
ambitious counterterrorism programme subsequently unveiled itself as a Trojan
horse that strengthened its hands over powers of legislation and law enforcement.
The analysis in this article draws a distinction between three types of
strategies, each having a transformative effect on policy-making, institution- and
agency-building and legislation. The first refers to a series of policy shifts:
measures aimed at the prevention, investigation or repression of terrorism. The
second refers to institutional shifts: organizational innovations or adaptations in
the number and composition of relevant actors, and interaction between old and
new actors. The third refers to legislative shifts: legal changes that were proposed
and introduced to respond to the challenge of terrorism, crime and public order
nuisance in general. As the Dutch response appears to be a radical departure from
its past—capable of characterization as a response to earlier terrorist experiences
without the introduction of a vast political counterterrorist agenda—a comparison
with the steps taken in some EU member states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and
the United Kingdom) may shed light on its overall aims and scope. Despite the
converging influence of EU-wide counterterrorism instruments on the domestic
agendas of EU member states, the Dutch have steered an independent, sovereign
course.
Assessing the terrorist threat in the Netherlands
Following the attacks in the United States of 11 September 2001 and the Madrid
railway bombings of 11 March 2004, the Netherlands experienced a shock of its
own:3 the assassination of Dutch film producer Theo van Gogh on 2 November
2004 (Rosenthal et al 2005). Mohammed Bouyeri, a Moroccan-Dutchman, shot van
Gogh in the stomach. After van Gogh staggered to the other side of the street,
Bouyeri shot him several more times and slashed his throat with a curved
machete. Bouyeri then pulled a smaller knife from his bag that he used to pin a
letter to the body of van Gogh. The letter was addressed to Ayaan Hirsi Ali who,
together with van Gogh, produced the movie, ‘Submission’, criticizing the abuse
of women under Islam (Buruma 2006, 2). The question of whether the intelligence
services could have prevented this ritualistic murder is still a subject of debate in
the Dutch parliament, despite a letter from the Minister of the Interior on 18
December 20064 making the case that though there was intelligence information
on the perpetrator, the information was incomplete, and the focus of the
intelligence services had mainly been on the (prevention of) large-scale,
internationally orchestrated attacks.
Intelligence sources claim that the Netherlands should still be regarded as a
potential target for terrorist attacks. Activities may vary in scale, from creation of
3 The Dutch government emphasized that measures cannot guarantee that the
Netherlands will be exempt from terrorist attacks. It read the railway bombings in Madrid
as an attack against western society: ‘The Netherlands is such a society’, it stated. See
Minutes of Parliament, Tweede Kamer (TK) 2003–2004, 27 925, no 123.
4 ‘Brief van de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties [Letter from the
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations]’, 18 December 2006, TK 2006–2007, 29 854,
number 18.
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a parallel normative order to infiltration of community-based institutions with the
ultimate aim of obstructing the proper functioning of civil society. From the Dutch
perspective at least, the threat of terrorism in the Netherlands and other European
countries is regarded as unremittingly substantial.5 This assessment of the terrorist
threat, after the Madrid bombings, is based on the former presence of Dutch troops
in Iraq, the current mission in Afghanistan, the close relationship between the
Netherlands and the US, and presence of Muslim groups in Dutch society who may
be susceptible to radicalization.6 According to the General Intelligence and
Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) 7, various
threats may emanate from radical Islam, one of which is terrorism:
In addition to radical Islamic organizations and networks which concentrate on the
Jihad (in the sense of armed combat) against the West, there are other groups, which
principally focus on ‘Dawa’ (the propagation of the radical-Islamic ideology), while
some groups and networks combine both. (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations, 2004, 7)
The term ‘jihad’ is defined as the Islamistic war, the deployment of violent
activities against perceived enemies of Islam in order to achieve a world that is a
pure reflection of the objectives originally stated in the first sources of Islamic
belief—the Koran and the Sunna (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
2002, 7).
Such threat assessment has shifted from external to internal, from international
to domestic or ‘home-grown’, and from hierarchically structured to networked
and fluid in character (Muller et al 2003, 31). Previous Dutch experiences with
terrorism were of a totally different nature. In the 1970s, the Netherlands was
faced with large-scale hostage situations (Muller 2003, 148, 155). Compared with
other European states, the Netherlands suffers relatively low (but significantly
higher than, for instance, Finland and Luxembourg) levels of terrorist incidents
(Bakker 2006a, 50; Van de Linde et al 2002, 4).
The official Dutch perspective is that in Western Europe, several international
networks of jihadi fighters became active after receiving training in Afghanistan,
Bosnia, Chechnya, Pakistan and Iraq. Legal investigations have concentrated on
individuals who take part in local and virtual networks. These networks have
allegedly been inspired by radical Islam. They have adopted Al Qaeda ideology
and seek to express this through mission and terrorism. Several mixed groups are
also active whereby individuals of local networks have international, command-
ing contacts. Prisons, the Internet and prayer houses are regarded as ‘hot-spots’
for radicalization (Van Hulst 2005, 5). Recruitment (for the jihad) is defined as
spotting (looking for and detecting potential recruits) and then monitoring and
5 Threat assessment of the National Anti-Terrorism Co-ordinator, ,http://www.
nctb.nl. .
6 Government letter addressed to parliament on the occasion of the installation of a
national anti-terrorism coordinator, 10 September 2004, 5306302/504.
7 Formerly the Netherlands National Security Service (Binnenlandse
Veiligheidsdiesnst, BVD), amended and changed by law. The Act of 7 February 2002,
namely the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wet op de Inlichtingen en
Veiligheidsdiensten 2002, WIV), providing for rules relating to the intelligence and security
services and amendment of several Acts, gives the General Intelligence and Security Service
powers to investigate.
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manipulating people to achieve an internalized radical political-Islamic (or
Islamistic) conviction, with the final purpose of having these people participate in
the jihad (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2002, 7). The General
Intelligence and Security Service identifies three risk groups, (mostly) men
between 18 and 32 years old, converts (as in the case of ‘shoe bomber’, Richard
Reid), and first-, second- or third-generation immigrant youths (who sympathize,
for example, with the Islamistic war against Israel):
the two young men of Moroccan descent . . . who were killed in January 2002 at the
Kashmir border, are a clear example of people recruited in the Netherlands for the
jihad and who travelled abroad to undergo military and ideological training and
(or) participate in the Islamistic war. It seems probable, as a careful estimate, that a
few dozens of people are currently involved in a recruitment process in the
Netherlands. (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2002, 9)
Central in the Dutch threat assessment is an image of terrorism as a multitude of
larger and smaller terrorist groups, cells and persons, who have become active in
the preparation and commitment of terrorist offences, inspired by the 9/11
attacks. Cases of individual radicalization (zelfontbranding) complement this
picture, whereby persons act in isolation from terrorist networks, mostly by
virtual means. Current terrorist groups are regarded as groups without a concrete
objective. The nature and location of their targets is as such hard to predict:
in studying the various strategic orientations within radical Islam, we may not
ignore the fact that various forms of radical Islam cannot be understood on the basis
of a clearly identifiable end-means rationality (ie, a coherent strategy). The activities
displayed are not really based on clear views regarding ends and means, but the
motives can rather be associated with (extreme) ideas about the perceived enemy,
and about how to fight this enemy. (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
2004, 5)
Social affiliation, through friendship or kinship, is seen as one of the pivotal
elements in the establishment of jihadi terrorist networks (Bakker 2006b, 56). Some
of the earlier legal investigations against violent jihadi terrorism resulted in the
release of individuals suspected of preparing terrorist acts before or during the
court proceedings, primarily because of lack of evidence. It was argued that secret
service intelligence could not be used in evidence, or that early interventions by
police and prosecution failed to produce substantial evidence that a terrorist act
was being prepared. Moreover, the General Intelligence and Security Service has
been cautious in revealing its sources while investigations were still taking place.
As we will see below, recent legal changes have resulted in a number of convictions.
Policy response
Shortly after 9/11, the then Dutch government announced a comprehensive action
plan against terrorism, entitled Action Plan Counter-Terrorism and Security
(Actieplan Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid).8 It contained a sizeable range of
measures for the intensification of the fight against terrorism, which, according to
8 , http://www.nctb.nl/Images/actieplan%20terrorismebestrijding%20en%
20veiligheid_tcm111-85220.pdf . .
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the government, introduced new priorities. According to initial estimates, e70–90
million were needed to achieve the various objectives, including the prevention of
terrorism.
Preventive measures against terrorism were meant to improve how the police
and intelligence services were placed in terms of information. Moreover, more
effort was to be invested in the protection of vulnerable subjects and objects. The
intelligence and security services were granted more financial means in order to
realize these objectives. On the technological side, a budgetary line was developed
on biometrics, that is, the identification of physical characteristics. According to
the Action Plan, biometrics was seen as a tool in tracking down terrorist suspects
and in identifying patterns and networks. As it was presumed that ‘terrorist
organizations make intensive use of modern technology’, the government sought
to extend its interception capacity by rapidly introducing the Action Plan Digital
Detection and modernizing police interception (‘tap’) rooms. Moreover, within
the European context, the Netherlands sought an ‘improvement’ of its visa policy
and central disclosure of information on the issuance of visas.
The staff of the Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee,
KMAR), who are responsible for immigration control at the border, was expanded
in order to intensify border controls and to employ ‘Mobile Aliens Control’—an
institutionalized procedure that replaces border control units with mobile patrol
units that drive around motorways ‘spotting’ vehicles suspected of bearing illegal
immigrants. Measures to secure civilian flight traffic were also extended, the
KMAR reinforcing its monitoring role in this capacity. At the border, the objective
was the checking of all bags and improved security of the cockpit. Moreover, the
government announced measures for the protection of the infrastructure of
government administration and private companies (including information and
communication technologies). In order to improve the possibility to intervene prior
to the actual occurrence of terrorist attacks, the government also proposed to
enhance the capacity of relevant agencies (see the section on ‘Institutional response’
below) in order to prevent, curb or reverse processes of radicalization and
recruitment. In line with the deconcentrated governmental structure, municipal
authorities were asked to improve local contacts with different communities.
The government Action Plan acknowledged and endorsed the need for an
international approach. The Netherlands is a partner in several international
initiatives, including the implementation of recommendations of the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) against money-laundering, the duty of states to
criminalize the disposal of financial means for the purpose of terrorist activities,
and the endorsement of the European Council resolution to freeze goods of
terrorist organizations in the event of ‘a serious suspicion’. For the fight against
terrorism, it was seen as important to focus on the link between terrorism and
financial flows, as the government sought to halt the financial support for terrorist
organizations. Measures included legislation (see below) and the improvement of
forensic accountancy.
In the wake of the Madrid railway bombings of March 2004, the government
reported progress on an additional measure in the fight against terrorism.9 The
9 ‘Beleidsplan Crisisbeheersing 2004–2007 [Policy plan crisis management 2004–
2007]’, TK 2003–2004, 29 668, number 1.
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new alert system (alerteringssysteem) would inform government agencies,
companies and (indirectly) citizens about increased chances of terrorist attacks
by using a set of codes. Certain codes are provided with extra preventive
measures. Moreover, ‘soft targets’ were to be mapped and spotted, because the
attacks in Madrid illustrated that terrorists were not merely interested in vital
targets, but also in large-scale attacks on arbitrary subjects and soft spots. The alert
system is not a public system, but a system in which administrative authorities,
companies and sectors are prompted to take measures, for example, to announce
that people are to refrain from travelling to and from Schiphol Airport in the event
of imminent danger. The alert system allows the application of different levels of
alert for different sectors (drinking water, railways, Schiphol Airport and
Rotterdam harbour). The technical and operational introduction of the system was
completed on 16 June 2005. The government announced the appointment of
permanent safety zones, such as Schiphol airport and (in the near future) all other
international airports in the Netherlands. Within these permanent safety zones, it
is possible to perform preventive searches.10
In line with the preventive engagement orientation, the Netherlands has
sought to perform foreign policy aimed at the de-escalation and management of
conflicts abroad. This implies support to source countries in the recognition and
identification of threats, with a view to reinforcing their capacity to prevent
attacks. At the same time, it is acknowledged that the terrorists are also recruited
in European countries. Preventive policies with regard to failed states are an
element of foreign policy, and results can only be expected in the long run.
Countries willing to acknowledge that terrorists may be plotting attacks on their
territory, will be offered (technical) support by the Dutch authorities, for instance,
in the interception of international communications.
Institutional response
The government Action Plan against Terrorism included a series of measures that
focused on arranging additional capacity for the investigation and prosecution of
terrorist offences and on acquiring qualified professionals for the analysis and
detection of those offences. The government also sought support for the
investigation of the special assistance capacity.11 Some 20 different organizations
in the Netherlands are involved in counterterrorism, either strategically or
operationally. The AIVD lost its monopoly on counterterrorism and witnessed the
emergence of new agencies on the scene. New partnerships had to be created, all
requiring specific intelligence and information.
An inquest into the murder of Pim Fortuyn (2002) was led by the Committee
Havermans. This resulted in a recommendation to expand the AIVD and to
innovate Information and Communication Technology. The expansion measure
was financed out of a reservation of e500 million for counterterrorism and anti-
radicalization purposes. The tasks, powers and competencies of the AIVD
remained unaffected. The Committee further recommended improving
cooperation of the AIVD with the police, Prosecution Service and local
10 , http://www.nctb.nl . .
11 Special Assistance Forces (Bijzondere Bijstands Eenheden, BBE).
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government. In its anti-terrorism Action Plan, the government budgeted e400
million for counterterrorism and anti-radicalization measures for a period of five
years. This culminated in a staff expansion in the AIVD (107 and 200 following the
Havermans report); 90 extra staff for police and Public Prosecution Service; 148
extra staff for the Royal Military Constabulary; 235 extra staff for the Royal and
Diplomatic Security Service (Dienst Koninklijke en Diplomatieke Beveiliging,
DKDB); and seven extra staff for the Protection and Security Service (Eenheid
Bewaken en Beveiligen, EBB).
A first innovation concerned the establishment of a National Anti-Terrorism
Co-ordinator (Nationaal Coo¨rdinator Terrorismebestrijding, NCTb)12 in 2004. The
objective was to bolster counterterrorism capacity, also with a view to complement
the capacity of the AIVD. The anti-terrorism coordinator leads an agency that
‘translates’ operational information and analyses into policy proposals and
implementation trajectories. The NCTb has five concrete missions and a staff of
just over 80 people13. First, it prepares policy-making at national and international
level for both ‘security’ ministers (the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the
Interior). Second, it is an analysis unit, as it prepares general threat assessments
from information drawn from the AIVD, the military intelligence service (MIVD)
and the regional police forces. Third, it prepares large projects, including the
introduction of the national alert system and coordination projects. The fourth
task of the NCTb is personal protection. The fifth is civil-aviation protection,14
which includes access control and identity and luggage checks. Also central to the
activities of the NCTb is cooperation with the private sector. With the creation of
the NCTb, the government has sought to elevate the importance of counter-
terrorism. It was argued that terrorism could not be solved simply by pooling
professionals from different organizations.15
Crucial in the new approach is the preparation of one joint strategic conceptual
policy framework, which has been tuned internationally and which determines
priorities in policies and activities. The NCTb ought to act as the spider in the web,
capable of organizing cooperation, management and decisive authority
(doorzettingsmacht)16 at a higher level. Moreover, it should combine, analyse and
use information that has been collected by third parties. The NCTb is accountable
to the Ministers of Justice and the Interior, and forms part of the budget of the
12 Government letter addressed to parliament on the installation of a national anti-
terrorism coordinator, 10 September 2004, TK 5306302/504; ‘Regeling van de Ministers van
Justitie en Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties van 29 juni 2005, nr DDS5357209,
houdende instelling van de Nationaal Coo¨rdinator Terrorismebestrijding [Decision of the
Ministers of Justice and the Interior and Kingdom Relations of 29 June 2005, no
DDS5357209, with regard to the establishment of the National Coordinator for the Fight
Against Terrorism]’, ,http://www.nctb.nl/Images/Instellingsregeling_tcm111-85322.
pdf . .
13 Interview with Tjibbe Joustra, national anti-terrorism coordinator, Fact, 1, 10, Deloitte,
4–9.
14 To this end, the Civil Aviation Inspector (Inspectie Beveiliging Burgerluchtvaart,
IBBLV) was placed under the authority of the NCTb. The National Coordinator for
Guarding and Protection (Nationaal Coo¨rdinator Bewaking en Beveiliging, NCBB/EBB)
was also brought under the NCTb.
15 Government letter addressed to parliament on the installation of a national anti-
terrorism coordinator, 10 September 2004, TK 5306302/504.
16 The Council of Ministers approved this measure on 24 June 2005.
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Ministry of Justice. The difference is that the threat assessments and analyses do
not focus on the level of individual suspects. The fact that the NCTb is primarily
answerable to the Minister of Justice and the AIVD primarily to the Minister of the
Interior is regarded as a significant obstacle in the communication between the
two agencies, and has formed one of the core arguments for the possible creation
of a joint Ministry of Safety (Brinkman 2006).
With a view to improving mutual communication and information exchange,
two coordination platforms were established: the Gezamenlijk Comite´ Terror-
ismebestrijding (GCT) and the Coo¨rdinerend Overleg Terrorismebestrijding
(COTb). The first platform is meant to coordinate counterterrorism policy and
strategy; the COTb is focused on operational coordination. In order to improve the
intelligence exchange between the various agencies and police forces, the Counter
Terrorism Information Box was created (Contra Terrorisme Informatiebox, CT-
Infobox). The AIVD has led this initiative, which compares information stemming
from police, justice, MIVD and Naturalization and Immigration service
(Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, IND). The CT-Infobox is a nodal information
and analysis unit. The information collected may form the basis for further
operational action, which may consist of law enforcement intervention,
immigration intervention, intelligence surveillance, distortion or a combination
of these methods. The effectiveness of the CT-Infobox remains an issue for debate
and has been doubted by insiders.
A Council for National Security (Raad voor de Nationale Veiligheid, RNV)17
was created as a subcouncil of the Council of Ministers. The RNV, which meets on
a monthly basis, is chaired by the Prime Minister. The Minister of Justice is the
coordinating minister for counterterrorism. The Ministers of Interior and
Kingdom Relations, Defence, and Aliens Affairs and Integration have also been
members of this council. The other ministries are expected to act on the basis of
cooperation. The central commanding authority (doorzettingsmacht) was added to
the portfolio of the Minister of Justice after a formal endorsement by the Council of
Ministers on 24 June 2005. It reflects the demand for effectiveness and immediate
response in a country with several political and administrative layers. A concrete
threat posed by a terrorist attack would be a punishable crime, which explains the
responsibility of the Minister of Justice through the Public Prosecution Service.18
When it is necessary to increase the scale of activities to the national level, the
Minister of Justice is advised by a policy team, composed of the head of the NCTb
(chairman), the Chairman of the Board of Prosecutors General, and the Chief
Constable of the national police service (Korps Landelijke Politie Diensten,
KLPD). The aim is to accelerate the response time and to minimize practical and
logistical obstacles.
The operational arena has also been subject to a few changes. A week after the
murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, two suspects were arrested in the
Hague. An explosive device went off prior to the arrest, and one of the suspects
was hit in the shoulder by a police bullet. This incident illustrated the need to
revise the BBEs (special assistance forces). A special inquiry into the functioning of
17 It replaces the former Council for Intelligence and Security Services (Raad voor de
Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten).
18 Government letter addressed to parliament on the installation of a national anti-
terrorism coordinator, 10 September 2004, 5306302/504.
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the BBEs had already been requested by the government. The report, which went
to the government but was not released in the public domain (Fijnaut 2004),
recommended the restructuring of all special services, including the special arrest
and support units of the police and the Royal Military Constabulary. The structure
was diagnosed as insufficiently coherent, with units lacking organizational,
operational and staff cohesion, which made it difficult to operate effectively in an
integrated manner, either preventatively or repressively. When judged against the
proportionality of terrorist violence, an imperfect balance was observed between
the special assistance units and the criminal investigation and intelligence services.
The Dutch government decided to follow up most aspects of the recommendations,
but did not give the green light for a full centralized structure.19
An interim (temporary) structure was set up to provide in a multidisciplinary
special assistance unit (BBE-Snelle Interventie Eenheid, BBE-SIE), which prepared
the ground for a single integrated special assistance unit, capable of rapid
intervention in all events of serious violence and/or terrorism. The new unit,
inaugurated on 1 July 2006, comprises military personnel and police officers, and
is capable of flexible downsizing or upsizing. The unit is part of the Special
Interventions Service (Dienst Speciale Interventies, DSI), which resides under the
management of the KLPD (national police service). The seven arrest and support
services (Aanhoudings-en Ondersteuningseenheden, AOEs) were reduced to six
(three units in the three largest police forces of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the
Hague, as well as one in the middle, one in the south, and one in the north of the
country). In serious cases, the AOEs are commanded by the DSI. The activities of
the DSI are subject to the authority of the President of the College of Prosecutors
General of the Public Prosecution Service, who carries a mandate on behalf of the
Minister of Justice.
Legislative response
The Dutch Rule of Law (Rechtsstaat) flexed its muscles against terrorism in an
unprecedented manner. The director of the AIVD observed that many of the legal
principles that were codified in the 1990s in response to the aberrations with
undercover policing methods were now outdated (Van Hulst 2005, 5). Serious
debates followed between human rights activists, pragmatists and hard-liners,
even within the (now former) coalition government, which accommodated
Christian-democrats, right-wing liberals and left-wing liberals.
The most significant legal response to the new threat of terrorism is the Law on
Terrorist Crimes (Wet Terroristische Misdrijven), the consequence of the (binding)
implementation of the EU Framework Decision, which entered into force on 23
June 2002.20 The new law has been inserted as a separate category of crimes in the
criminal law, and entered into force on 10 August 2004.21 Terrorism had hitherto
not been defined in Dutch legislation, which meant that no one could be sentenced
for membership of a terrorist organization or for carrying out terrorist attacks.
19 ‘Brief van de Minister van Justitie [Letter from the Minister of Justice]’, TK 2004–2005,
29 754, number 23, 3 June 2005.
20 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 164/3, 22 June 2002.
21 Staatsblad 393, 29 July 2004.
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Persons suspected of such actions could be prosecuted for criminal activities
normally performed by terrorists, such as kidnapping, trespassing, manslaughter
or murder. Article 140 of the Dutch Criminal Code already made it possible to
define membership of a criminal organization as a criminal offence. The new law
has defined preparatory activities as well as conspiracy. Moreover, the new law
has effectively criminalized recruitment for the violent jihad and has raised
maximum sentences for criminal activities such as manslaughter, serious
maltreatment, abduction and hostage-taking, if they are committed with a
terrorist intention. When the crime is punishable with a sentence of maximum of
15 years (such as manslaughter), the prison sentence can be raised to life or
maximum of 20 years. The maximum penalty for recruitment for the violent jihad
has been raised from one to four years. Conspiracy is now separately punishable,
which facilitates law enforcement operations against terrorist groups or networks
that operate in a loose or linked cooperative framework.
These recent measures have enabled the Public Prosecution Service to use
criminal procedural powers and to intervene at an early stage. In turn, this is
meant to facilitate international cooperation between law enforcement services,
including mutual legal assistance. In order to prove conspiracy, there has to be
evidence that two or more persons have been conspiring to commit a serious
terrorist offence. The Dutch Criminal Procedure Code provides that a criminal
case has to be dealt with by a court 106 days after the demand for custody, and
demands that all dossiers relating to the proceedings are accessible. The
government argued that in terrorist cases, this legal period may be too short and
that the rule of access may jeopardize the intelligence-gathering process. As a
consequence, the (now former) government has sought to amend the law in such a
way that in the event of terrorist cases, the trial dossier is ‘to be held incomplete’
for a longer period of time. Two legislative proposals have not yet been endorsed
by parliament, namely the bill that proposes to amend the Dutch Criminal
Procedure Code for protected witnesses (and for the use of material of the
intelligence services for the purpose of criminal court proceedings), and the bill
that proposes to expand extraordinary and proactive powers for police and law
enforcement agencies.22
In the meantime, the Public Prosecution Service has stepped up its
proceedings against various suspects of terrorism. In January 2006, prison
sentences of up to 20 years were demanded for some members of the ‘Hofstad’
group in the so-called ‘Piranha’ process, some of whom were held responsible for
the attempted murder of police officers.23 Jason W and Ismail A were convicted on
the basis of the new law on terrorist offences and received prison sentences of 15
years and 13 years, respectively. Mohamed Bouyeri, who did not receive a
22 ‘Wetsvoorstel tot Wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafvordering, het Wetboek van
Strafrecht en enige andere wetten ter verruiming van de mogelijkheden tot opsporing en
vervolging van terroristische misdrijven [Bill to Amend the Criminal Procedure Code, the
Criminal Code, and some other laws for the extension of possibilities to investigate and
prosecute terrorist crimes]’, TK 2004–2005, 30 164, number 2; ‘Wetsvoorstel tot wijziging
van het Wetboek van Strafvordering in verband met het treffen van een regeling voor
afgeschermde getuigen en enkele andere onderwerpen [Bill to Amend the Criminal
Procedure Code in relation to the establishment of an arrangement for protected witnesses
and some other subjects]’, TK 2003–2004, 29 743, number 2.
23 , http://www.om.nl/terrorisme/_terrorisme_nieuwsberichten/25742/ . .
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sentence because he is already serving a life-long imprisonment for the murder of
Theo van Gogh, was convicted for membership of a terrorist organization. The
judge even regarded him as the leader of the Hofstad Group. The Public
Prosecution Service lodged an appeal to the High Court against the acquittal of
Samir A, who had been suspected of preparing a large-scale terrorist attack. They
won the appeal and the case has been referred back to the original court.
Additional legal measures include a change of the Law on Weapons and
Ammunition (Wet Wapens en Munitie) and the introduction of preventive
searches ( preventief fouilleren). In the event of concrete indications, the law on
weapons and ammunition makes it possible to open packages, stop and search
vehicles, as well as frisk individuals. This new measure has been introduced on
top of the competence of local authorities to stage preventive searches on
individuals. Proactive law enforcement competences (telephone tapping,
infiltration, systematic surveillance) have been widened to investigations where
there may not (yet) be the indication of a concrete punishable crime. The
performance of those competences is now possible in relation to the conspiracy of
or active execution of terrorist acts. Most terrorist suspects are apprehended and
detained on the basis of light criminal offences. Normally, imprisonment has to
end when the investigating judge (rechter commissaris) does not extend the custody,
such as in cases where the investigations do not result in new or hard evidence (eis
van ernstige bezwaren).
In June 2005, the then government approved a legislative proposal that allows
the limitation of rights for suspects of terrorism:24 Someone suspected of a
terrorist crime can be subject to limitations for a period of up to two years. This
may relate to prohibitions to enter certain zones and a notification duty at a police
station. These are administrative measures that may be used as part of the wider
anti-terrorism package. People who are subject to these measures, which can be
extended every three months, may appeal against them by registering a complaint
with either the Ministry of the Interior or the Council of State. The legislative
proposal also provides for a measure whereby subsidies or licenses may be
withdrawn or suspended.
Further legal measures will widen the possibility for the Prosecution Service to
acquire identification data from nongovernmental organizations.25 Until now, this
had not been possible as a result of data-protection requirements. Article 9, 1 Data
Protection Law (Wet Bescherming Persoonsgegevens) can be waived by a Public
Prosecutor in the interest of the acquisition of orienteering information concerning
terrorist crimes when it concerns public registers or databases. The 2001
24 ‘Regels inzake het opleggen van beperkende maatregelen aan personen met het oog
op de bescherming van de nationale veiligheid en inzake het weigeren of intrekken van
beschikkingen met het oog op de bescherming van de nationale veiligheid [Rules
concerning the imposition of limiting measures to persons with a view to protect the
national security and concerning the refusal or withdrawal of orders with a view to
protecting national security], Wet bestuurlijke maatregelen nationale veiligheid [Law
administrative measures national security]’, TK 2005–2006, 30 566, number 2.
25 ‘Goedkeuring van het op 24 april 1986 te Straatsburg totstandgekomen Europees
Verdrag inzake de erkenning van de rechtspersoonlijkheid van internationale niet-
gouvernementele organisaties [Approval of the European Treaty signed on 24 April 1986 on
the recognition of the legal personality of international nongovernmental organizations]’,
TK 2002–2003, 27 764, number 2.
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Government Action Plan against Terrorism also focused on legislation concerning
the monitoring of financial transactions and the investigation of irregular
(ongebruikelijke) transactions. The laws on the notification of irregular transactions
(Melding Ongebruikelijke Transacties) and on sanctions (sanctiewet), as well as
identification procedures in relation to financial services, were to be improved.
Freelance practitioners of law and financial services (private accountants and
insurance brokers, for example) and trust offices (trust-kantoren), entities other
than banks to which individuals and organizations entrust their wealth, are now
subject to compulsory notification and increased scrutiny. The Civil Law Code
makes it possible for the Public Prosecution Service to use administrative
competences for the investigation and sanctioning of foundations (for example,
charity organizations) suspected of supporting terrorist organizations. To this end,
there will be close cooperation with the Financial Expertise Centre.
Finally, the Government Action Plan called for fast ratification of extradition
treaties and the amended EU Directive on Money Laundering. The ratification of
the UN conventions against financing of terrorism and ‘bomb’-terrorism was
encouraged and under discussion in the national parliament. The Netherlands
made an effort to ratify the EU Mutual Legal Assistance Convention by the end of
2002, which would facilitate the creation of Joint Investigation Teams. The
government also stressed the need for a rapid ratification of the Crime in
Cyberspace Convention.
Synthesis: The Dutch response from a comparative perspective
At first blush, the Dutch response to 9/11 stands out to some extent when
compared to the responses of the other EU member states. From the available
data, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK have all followed
their own internal rhythm, path and logic, based on their history with terrorism
(Van de Linde et al 2002, 4). In general, national responses to 9/11 can be
considered as cumulative to previous counterterrorism policies. Furthermore, the
European countries seemed to have had different opinions about the speed of, and
need for, legislative and organizational reform. This differentiated pattern
resembles the response of individual EU member states to international organized
crime (den Boer, 2002). Table 1 presents an overview of the policy, institutional and
legislative responses to terrorism in the mentioned countries. This facilitates a
more systematic comparison with the counterterrorism strategy assumed in the
Netherlands.
When one compares these national responses to terrorism, a few observations
can be made. The first general observation is that while in some EU member states
the catastrophic attacks in the US provided a political window of opportunity for
drafting and adopting new anti-terrorism legislation, in some others these attacks
did not seem to have the same transformative impact on the legislation, policy or
institutional architecture. The second observation is that though the UK and Spain
have had similar experiences with the persistence of domestic terrorism, they
demonstrated different responses to participation opportunities within the EU
and to the establishment of new domestic anti-terrorism legislation. A third
observation is that all countries included in this comparison have responded
to terrorism with a firm institutional move toward centralized coordination of
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Table 1. A comparison of national responses to terrorism in Europe
COUNTRY FRANCE GERMANY ITALY NETHERLANDS SPAIN UNITED KINGDOM
HISTORY Separatist Corsicans,
Cellules Combattantes
(CCC), Action Directe
and the Armed Isla-
mic Group (GIA);
cross-border cam-
paign of Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (ETA)
(Cettina 2003, 87).
Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF);
extreme right and ‘imported
terrorism’ incidents (Partiya
Karkereˆn Kurdistan, PKK,
Palestinians 1972); post-9/11
focus on transnational, reli-
giously inspired terrorism.
Brigate Rosse (Red
Brigades) and right-
wing extremist
groups.
Moluccan train
hijackings; instances
of imported terror-
ism, for example,
Irish Republican Army
(IRA), ETA and
French Embassy
hostage crisis; mur-
der of Theo van
Gogh 2 November
2004 by Muslim
fundamentalist.
Euskadi Ta Askata-
suna (ETA); Madrid
railway bomb
attacks by radical
jihadists on 11 March
2004, killing 189 and
injuring 1,460
people.
Irish Republican Army
(IRA); jihadist bombing
of Pan Am flight over
Lockerbie, Scotland,
1988; London under-
ground bombings by
jihadists, 7 July 2005;
several scares and
arrests.
POLICY Pre-9/11: pragmatic
policy; Vigipirate
Plan 1991. Focus on
law enforcement
response. Special
anti-terror magis-
trate.
Post-9/11: revision
of Vigipirate Plan,
with crisis and dis-
aster management
plan in response to
loss of life during
heatwave.
Pre-9/11: specific policies
such as introduction, in 1972,
of scrutiny procedure for civil
servants, and frequent usage
of profiling. Post-9/11:
improved immigration con-
trol and international
cooperation, destruction of
terrorist organizations, criti-
cal infrastructure protection.
Measures to integrate 36
different counterterrorism
agencies. Creation of the
Federal Office for Civil Pro-
tection and Disaster Response
(Bundesamt fu¨r Bevolker-
ungsschutz und Katastrophen-
hilfe, BBK) and Gemeinsamen
Terrorismus Abwehrzentrum
(GTAZ), which coordinates
all agencies involved in the
fight against terrorism, and a
national archive of personal
data.
Pre-9/11: first
repression, then pre-
vention and inter-
national
cooperation. Post-
9/11: increased sur-
veillance of potential
strategic targets
(water, electric sys-
tems, chemical
industry); further
development of a
national emergency
plan.
Pre-9/11: no explicit
policy, except intelli-
gence-gathering by
Intelligence Service,
mainly on ‘imported
terrorism’.
Post-9/11: vast pro-
gramme of measures
(see main text).
Pre-9/11: repressive
policy; arrest of ETA
terrorists on French
soil; permanent
monitoring police,
guardia civil, and
private security.
Intensified activity
against Islamic ter-
rorists; more proac-
tive intervention.
Post-Madrid:
improvement of
intelligence
exchange and inte-
gration of minority
groups.
Pre-9/11: policy primar-
ily focused on the IRA;
aviation security
measures after ‘Locker-
bie’.
Post-9/11: creation in
2002 of a Security and
Intelligence Coordinator
within Cabinet Office;
Home Office Five Year
Strategic Plan 2004–2008
(Cross-Departmental
Counter Terrorism Strat-
egy called CONTEST);
Civil Contingencies Act
2004; single national fra-
mework for regional and
local responses to crises
and large-scale calami-
ties; increased budget for
intelligence-gathering
and emergency
planning.
Continued
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COUNTRY FRANCE GERMANY ITALY NETHERLANDS SPAIN UNITED KINGDOM
INSTITU-
TION
Pre-9/11: close
cooperation between
police, gendarmes
and the army; local
surveillance at vul-
nerable points;
international
cooperation.
Post-9/11: creation
of the Council of
Internal Security (Le
Conseil de se´curite´
inte´rieure, CSI) and
reforms in intelli-
gence services.
Pre-9/11: coexistence of
intelligence services: Federal
Intelligence Service (Bundes-
nachrichtendienst, BND), Fed-
eral Bureau for the Protection
of the Constitution (BfV), and
Military Counterintelligence
Service (MAD).
Post-9/11: some level of cen-
tralization from establish-
ment of the Joint
Coordination Centre for the
intelligence services in Berlin
in July 2004 under the Federal
Ministry of the Interior.
Modifications, for example,
improved cooperation
between police and secret
services, interception man-
date widened, data-mining of
immigration databases. After
London bombing of July
2005, extension of (proactive)
competences for German
Federal Police Agency (Bun-
deskriminalamt, BKA), which
had already obtained man-
date to conduct its own anti-
terrorism investigations after
9/11. Creation of GTAZ and
BBK in 2004.
Pre-9/11: centralized
anti-terrorism unit
within the Ministry
of the Interior, with
multiagency
cooperation; inter-
ministerial bodies
such as the Public
Order and Security
Committee and
Inter-Ministerial
Committee for Intel-
ligence and Security
(CIIS); protection of
the financial system
against terrorism;
special police and
prosecutors dealing
with terrorism. Mili-
tary Intelligence and
Security Service
(SISMI) and Demo-
cratic Intelligence
and Security Service
(SISDE) coordinated
by Executive Com-
mittee for the Intelli-
gence and Security
Services (CESIS).
Post-9/11: no sub-
stantial institutional
changes.
Pre-9/11: terrorism
not priority; Internal
Security Service
(Binnenlandse Vei-
ligheidsdienst, BVD)
forerunner of the
General Intelligence
and Security Service
(Algemene Inlichtin-
gen- en Veiligheids-
dienst, AIV)
responsible for
counterterrorism in
cooperation with the
Regional Intelligence
Centres (Regionale
Inlichtingen Diensten,
RIDs).
Post-9/11: creation
of anti-terrorism
coordinator and
comprehensive anti-
terrorism action
plan, as well as
reforms of special
assistance forces (see
main text).
Pre-9/11: joint
Command Centre at
Director General
level, specialist
units.
Post-Madrid: Gov-
ernment Committee
for Crisis Situations
and National Centre
for Anti-terrorism
Coordination
(CNCA), consisting
of police, Guardia
Civil and National
Intelligence Centre
(CNI).
Pre-9/11: activity of
three main intelligence
services MI5, MI6 and
GCHQ (Government
Communications Head
Quarters), complemen-
ted by a National Co-
ordinator for Terrorist
Investigations.
Post-9/11: creation of the
Joint Terrorism Analysis
Centre (JTAC) in 2003.
Cooperation of agencies
in Serious Organised
Crime Agency (SOCA).
Continued
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COUNTRY FRANCE GERMANY ITALY NETHERLANDS SPAIN UNITED KINGDOM
LEGISLA-
TION
Pre-9/11: 1986 defi-
nition of terrorism;
introduction of cen-
tralist and specialist
elements in anti-ter-
rorism trial pro-
cedures; special
investigatory magis-
trates. Cooperation
between secret ser-
vices and criminal
investigation
agencies. In 1996,
new law created
specific and separate
terrorist charge
(conspiracy), with
proactive element
for investigation of
terrorist offences.
Post-9/11: anti-ter-
rorist provisions to
strengthen compe-
tences of police ser-
vices (15 November
2001).
Pre-9/11: elaborate
anti-terrorism legislation
in response to RAF.
Post-9/11: definition of
terrorist offences in
paragraphs 129a and b
of Criminal Code based on
EU Framework Decision.
Article 129a refers to a gen-
eral definition of terrorism,
including recruitment, train-
ing, preparatory acts and
financing. Article 129b lists
the articles concerning the
membership of a terrorist
organization (murder, geno-
cide or other offences aimed
against the freedom of indi-
viduals or the public).
Pre-9/11: judidical
category of Pentiti
(repentant terrorists
or criminals). 1980
introduction of ter-
rorist offence into
Article 270bis of the
criminal code.
Post-9/11: 2001
amendment to
monitor violence by
international organ-
izations. Explicit
definition of terror-
ism on 31 July 2005,
comprising elements
of EU Framework
Decision on combating
terrorism.
Pre-9/11: no penali-
zation of terrorist
offence.
Post-9/11: 10 August
2004 entry into force
of new anti-terror-
ism legislation,
penalizing partici-
pation and conspi-
racy. Several
legislative propo-
sals, for example,
widening of powers
of prosecution (see
main text).
Pre-9/11: 1977 cre-
ation of special court
in Madrid for terror-
ism and organized
crime. 1978 consti-
tutional law addres-
sing terrorist crimes.
2001 Penal Code that
includes new pro-
visions (Reinares
2003, 64f).
Post-9/11: special
law in 2003 for pre-
vention and freezing
of terrorist goods.
Domestic anti-ter-
rorism laws were
compared with EU
Framework Decision
on combating terror-
ism, without
additional legis-
lation deemed
necessary.
Pre-9/11: prevention of
Terrorism Act (1974–
1989) providing special
police competences, out-
lawing of paramilitary
organizations and cre-
ation of Diplock courts
(no jury). Terrorism Act
(TACT) provisions (2000)
increasing focus on
international terrorism,
strengthening stop and
search competences, and
strengthening arrest
powers.
Post-9/11: Anti-terror-
ism, Crime and Security
Act 2001 (ATCSA),
streamlining immigra-
tion procedures, infra-
structure security and
extension of police com-
petencies. Detaining
foreign suspects of ter-
rorism without concrete
suspicion.
(Neve et al, 2006; Archik et al 2006; German Embassy 2005)
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anti-terrorism policies, intelligence-gathering and crisis management responses.
A fourth observation is that in most of the selected EU member states it is
noticeable that more energy was invested in multiagency or multidisciplinary
cooperation. Finally, these responses have been complemented by a light form of
legal harmonization, which has been achieved particularly through the EU
Framework decision on combating terrorism and the Framework decision on the European
arrest warrant.26 The latter instrument has had a harmonizing effect on the
extradition regime in the EU, which applies to 32 different criminal offences, of
which terrorism is just one category (den Boer 2006, 93). EU anti-terrorism policies
have had a strong influence on those domestic criminal justice systems that did
not yet have their own anti-terrorism legislation (such as the criminal justice
system of the Netherlands). The implementation of EU measures, such as the
(binding) European Arrest Warrant (Blekxtoon 2004), is a matter of domestic
politics and is thus subject to variation between and within the member states. In
the UK, for instance, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 facilitates
rapid implementation of the Council Framework decision on combating terrorism, but
the European arrest warrant is to be implemented under primary legislation and not
under the 2001 Act (Walker 2003, 24).
Conclusion
The Dutch case study shows that the Netherlands has woken up to the threat
of terrorism and radicalization, and has responded to this new threat with a
substantial series of measures. It is hard to explain this sudden activity in light
of the virtual absence of anti-terrorism measures prior to 9/11. An explanatory
factor may be that the Netherlands had a centre-right government that
embraced these measures in an attempt to assert its central authority over law
enforcement activity, and which sought to tackle radicalization by further
labelling, isolating and repressing. It may also be argued that most of the anti-
terrorism measures have ultimately been used for wider surveillance and
intervention purposes, rather than for the mere prevention of terrorism.
However, even under the now former centre-right government, a subtle but
significant shift has been noticeable: initially, there was a strong reliance on
repressive criminal law measures. The (cautious) pro-integration debate is of a
more recent date, as repressive strategies are deemed to have had an adverse
effect on the ability of communities to interact and participate, and have
tended to further alienate the position of law enforcement agencies from
society (Tagmount 2006). With the relatively one-sided choice for repression,
and selective and proactive investigation, the Netherlands seems to have
abandoned its traditional culture of trust, familiarity and tolerance. However
in February 2007, the new government announced a coalition agreement with
a more prointegrative tone. Due to the new composition of parliament, there
may even be insufficient endorsement of formerly tabled anti-terrorism bills.
Meanwhile, the counterterrorism strategy of the Netherlands has resulted in a
considerable widening of the Rule of Law. A number of authors have expressed
their concern that these rapid and cumulative institutional and legal interventions
26 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 190, 18 July 2002.
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have transformed the Netherlands into a full-fledged surveillance society (Jansen
and Janssen 2006) with a set of weakly counterbalanced rules and competences
that might be uncontrollable if in the ‘wrong’ hands (Van Gunsteren 2004). The
democratic paradox has thus presented itself as a concise but hard dilemma: how
to stay within the limits of the democratic legal order whilst curbing activities that
potentially undermine democracy? Several international treaties provide national
authorities with the possibility to expand their competencies. Whether these
measures can be considered as truly effective means against violent radicalization
and terrorism remains to be clarified in future practice and research.
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